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Forced technology transfer has emerged from the US–China trade war as a new issue of
systemic importance. The USA, the European Union, and Japan have jointly condemned
forced technology transfer as a practice undermining the proper function of international
trade and called for new WTO rules to discipline the practice. This article examines the
issue in the broad context of international economic law. It seeks to address the following
questions: What does ‘forced technology transfer’ mean? Where did this practice come
from? Why is there insu!cient international regulation on the issue? What exactly are
the problems inherent in such practice? And what can be done to improve the relevant
international regulation?
INTRODUCTION
The US–China trade war was o!cially triggered by US allegations of China’s unfair
trade practices in technology transfer and intellectual property under Section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974.1 According to the USA, China, among other things, practices ‘forced
technology transfer’ by using administrative processes and ownership restrictions to
coerce US "rms to transfer technology to Chinese entities. Based on these allegations,
the Trump administration has resorted to unilateral actions under Section 301. Since
July 2018, the USA has levied additional tari#s on more than half of Chinese imports;
denying these allegations, China has retaliated in kind.2 At the time of writing, the trade
! Professor of Law, Wayne State University, U.S.A. I am grateful to Anne van Aaken, Chad Bown, Andrew Lang,
Ruosi Zhang, Milan Hejtmanek, and two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments on dra$s of this
article. Email: ya.qin@wayne.edu.
1 United States Trade Representatives, ‘Findings of the Investigation into China’s Acts, Policies and Practices
Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property and Innovation under Section 301 of the Trade
Act of 1974’, (22 March 2018) (‘Section 301 Report’), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/"les/Section%20301
%20FINAL.PDF.
2 For details of tari#s levied during the trade war, see Chad Bown and Malina Kolb, ‘Trump’s Trade
War Timeline: An Up-to-Date Guide’, https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/trump-
trade-war-china-date-guide.
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war has further evolved into a technology war, with the USA imposing sanctions on top
Chinese technology companies.3
Despite the apparent WTO-illegality of Section 301 tari#s,4 the USA has garnered
support from the European Union and Japan speci"cally on the issue of forced technol-
ogy transfer. The three parties have issued several joint statements, condemning forced
technology transfer as a practice ‘harmful to the development and use of innovative
technologies’ and ‘undermining the proper functioning of international trade.’5 Identi-
fying forced technology transfer as ‘a major trade irritant,’ the EU has called for enacting
new WTO rules to discipline the practice6 and has brought a WTO complaint against
China on the issue.7 Forced technology transfer, therefore, has emerged for the "rst time
as an issue of systemic importance for the world trade regime.
This article seeks to examine this issue in the context of international economic
law. It has several goals. First, it seeks to clarify what ‘forced technology transfer’
means (Section I). Though widely used, the notion lacks a clear de"nition and is o$en
misunderstood. Second, it traces the origin of ‘forced technology transfer’ in China to
the ‘market for technology’ policy adopted in the early days of China’s economic reform
(Section II), and inquires whether this policy is a legitimate tool for economic develop-
ment or an unfair trade practice (Section IV). Third, it examines existing international
regulation on technology transfer and seeks to explain why such regulation does not
e#ectively discipline ‘forced technology transfer’ (Section III). Lastly, the article pro-
poses a way to establish a new multilateral discipline that can address the issue of ‘forced
technology transfer’ equitably (Section V). The overall objective of this new discipline
is to achieve a proper balance between the need to promote dissemination of technology
and the need to ensure fair competition in international trade and investment.
I. WHAT IS ‘FORCED TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER’?
Technology, broadly de"ned,8 can be disseminated from its originating source to other
parties and places via various means. It may be disseminated through education, tech-
nological aid, employment, commercial transactions, or outright the$. More typically,
cross-border transfers of technology are carried out through commercial transactions.
Such a transaction may involve licensing, in which the transferor permits the transferee
3 US Department of Commerce has ‘blacklisted’ Huawei and several other Chinese tech companies for export
control. See 84 FR 22961 (21 May 2019); 84 FR 29371 (24 June 2019). See also David Lynch, ‘How the
U.S.–China Trade War Became a Con%ict over the Future of Tech’, The Washington Post (22 May 2019).
4 The WTO provisions at issue include Articles 1 (MFN) and II (tari# bindings) of the General Agreement
on Tari#s and Trade, and Article 23 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. See China’s WTO complaints,
United States–Tari! Measures on Certain Goods "om China, WT/DS543/1, 5 April 2018; United States–Tari!
Measures on Certain Goods "om China II, WT/DS565/1, 27 August 2018.
5 See e.g. Joint Statement on Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of the United States, Japan and the
European Union, Annexed Statement 2: Joint Statement on Technology Transfer Policies and Practices,
(31 May 2018).
6 The European Commission, WTO–EU’s Proposals on WTO Modernization (5 July 2018) (‘The EU Concept
Paper’), http://src.bna.com/Aoe.
7 See China – Certain Measures on the Transfer of Technology, Request for Consultations By the European Union,
WT/DS549/1/Rev. 1, 8 January 2019.
8 Technology is de"ned to include all information protected by patents, trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets,
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to use its technology for a certain period of time, or a sale in which the transferor
assigns its ownership of the technology to the transferee, or an investment in which the
transferor contributes its technology as equity investment in the transferee.
In spite of its wide use, the term ‘forced technology transfer’ has not been well
de"ned.9 The term de"es an easy de"nition because what constitutes, or is perceived as,
a ‘forced’ transfer depends not only on the degree of compulsion imposed by a particular
government policy but also on the speci"c conditions of the "rm a#ected thereby. The
situation can be further complicated when the government policy is implemented via
implicit means.10
For the purpose of this article, I will use the term generally to refer to any situation
in which the government requires a foreign "rm to share its proprietary information in
order to conduct business in the country.11 Based on their implications for international
economic law and policies, I will draw a distinction between two types of situations:
(i) where the transfer is the result of disclosure of proprietary information compelled
by administrative processes; and (ii) where the transfer is the result of ownership
restrictions on foreign investment, such as mandatory joint venture ( JV) requirements.
A. Disclosure of proprietary information compelled by administrative
processes
A foreign "rm may be required to disclose its proprietary information through a variety
of administrative processes in order to obtain or maintain market access. In doing busi-
ness with China, foreign "rms are subject to a myriad of administrative requirements,
ranging from approvals of speci"c investments, to various licensing requirements, to
approvals of speci"c products, to regulatory compliance in antitrust investigations and
national security reviews. In this regard, the most serious allegations are that, through
these administrative processes, Chinese government agencies have forced foreign "rms
to disclose sensitive technical information, including proprietary formulas or designs,
source code, databases, and trade secrets that are unnecessary for any legitimate regu-
latory purpose.12 For "rms that have already made initial investments in the country,
refusal to comply with government requests for information would be a recipe for
losing their investments and likely access to the entire Chinese market. Under such
circumstances, the "rms would have ‘no choice’ but to comply with the government
requests. The proprietary information so disclosed in the administrative processes
could then be passed onto competing domestic entities.
9 The EU describes ‘forced technology transfer’ to mean ‘where foreign operators are directly or indirectly
forced to share their innovation and technology with the state or with domestic operators’. The EU Concept
Paper, supra note 6.
10 See Dan Prud’homme et al., ‘Forced Technology Transfer’ Policies: Workings in China and Strategic Implica-
tions’, 134 Technological Forecasting and Social Change 150–68 (2018); OECD, International Technology
Transfer Policies, TAD/TC/WP (2018)8/Final, 14 January 2019 (describing a spectrum of government
policies that can cause a "rm to transfer proprietary technologies).
11 In contrast, the USTR has used the term to encompass China’s overseas acquisitions of US companies
with cutting-edge technologies and cyber the$. See USTR, 2018 Report to Congress on China’s WTO
Compliance (February 2019), p. 17.
12 Section 301 Report, pp. 41–43. See also B. Davis, ‘How China Systematically Pries Technology From U.S.
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These alleged administrative practices would amount to disguised government
expropriation of foreign intellectual property rights, in violation of generally accepted
international principles. Such practices would also violate the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), under which China is
obligated to protect undisclosed information submitted to the government agencies
against unfair competition and unfair commercial use.13 Furthermore, requiring
foreign "rms to disclose proprietary information in connection with the administrative
approval processes would run afoul of China’s speci"c WTO commitments not to
condition approvals of foreign investment on the transfer of technology.14 Thus,
while the allegations may be di!cult to prove in practice, it is uncontroversial that any
disguised expropriation of foreign IP must be condemned. Indeed, in an apparent e#ort
to address foreign concerns and to rea!rm its WTO commitments, China has adopted
provisions in its new Foreign Investment Law that explicitly prohibit administrative
organs and their sta# from disclosing or illegally providing others the trade secrets
of foreign investors that become known to them during their performance of
duties.15
B. Ownership restrictions on foreign investment
Ownership limitation on foreign investment is said to be one of the ‘most important
sources’ of the problem of forced technology transfer.16 Compared to forced disclosure
of propriety information, the allegation of forced technology transfer via ownership
restrictions raises a more complex set of issues. First, there is no general principle
of international law prohibiting governments from imposing ownership restrictions
on foreign investment. Thus, China is not generally prevented from limiting foreign
ownership except where it has made speci"c treaty commitments, such as in the
service sectors under GATS and in the automotive industry under its WTO accession
protocol.17
Second, forced technology transfer in this context is not ‘free transfer’. In the case
of technology being contributed as an equity investment, the value of the technology
will be assessed as part of the foreign equity. In the case of technology being licensed
to a JV, the foreign investor will receive licensing fees from the JV, the amount of
which is subject to negotiation.18 According to one study, China ranks fourth globally
in 2016 (a$er Ireland, the Netherlands and the USA) in the total amount paid for
13 TRIPS, art. 39.
14 See supra text, at note 66.
15 PRC Foreign Investment Law, arts 23 and 39 (e#ective 1 January 2020). A similar provision in existing
law applies more narrowly to government employees in the administration of technology import. See PRC
Regulation on the Administration of Import and Export of Technologies (2002), art. 23.
16 The EU Concept Paper, supra note 6.
17 See China’s GATS Schedule (mode 3); Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China,
WT/MIN(01)/3, 10 November 2001 (‘WPR’), paras 204–07.
18 This does not mean the commercial terms of a technology transfer will not be subject to government
regulation. On the contrary, the government may impose restrictions on all aspects of technology transfer,
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foreign IP.19 Hence, the case of ‘forced technology transfer’ via ownership restrictions
must be distinguished from government expropriation or compulsory licensing, where
the government may compel the transfer of technology without the consent of the
technology owner and adequate compensation.20
Third, the transfer of technology may be compelled by foreign ownership restric-
tions in di#erent ways. One is via mandatory JV requirements. If certain technology is
necessary for the JV operation, the foreign owner will have no choice but to share it with
its domestic partner, which may subsequently become a competitor. By comparison,
the foreign investor in a wholly foreign-owned enterprise (WFOE) will have sole
control over its operation, thus is less exposed to the risk of losing key technology to its
competitors.21 Furthermore, in the JV negotiations the Chinese party may be under
government pressure to demand technologies that the foreign party would not
otherwise be willing to provide. Because mandatory JVs must be approved by the
government, it is practically impossible to tell whether the demand for technology is
attributable to government pressure or stems entirely from the Chinese party involved.
Besides the JV requirement, the transfer of technology may be compelled as a result of
an outright ban of foreign investment in speci"c sectors. A prominent example in this
regard is cloud computing. According to US and EU complaints, China e#ectively pre-
cludes foreign cloud service providers from directly participating in the most common
forms of cloud computing.22 For the US and EU cloud service providers, foregoing
the China market is simply not a commercially viable option because their customers
demand cloud services which, by nature, must be made globally available. Conse-
quently, they have no choice but to enter into contractual arrangements with Chinese
entities eligible to provide such services and to transfer their proprietary cloud comput-
ing technologies to the Chinese entities in exchange for a fee or a share of the revenue.23
C. Insu!cient enforcement v. insu!cient regulation
In thinking about how international economic law should respond to the two types
of situations identi"ed above, it is important to distinguish the case of insu!cient
enforcement from that of insu!cient regulation. For disclosure of proprietary infor-
mation compelled by administrative processes that constitutes ‘disguised government
expropriation’, the basic legal principles are clear. While further elaboration of these
principles through more speci"c rules may be desirable, the chief problem lies in the lack
of enforcement of existing law. For technology transfer via ownership restrictions, on
the other hand, the picture is a mixed one. To the extent that ownership restrictions do
not contravene any obligation under the WTO or investment agreements, and that the
19 Nicholas Lardy, ‘China: Forced Technology Transfer and The$?’, Peterson Institute of International Economics,
China Economic Watch blog (20 April 2018) (based on IMF data).
20 Under TRIPS art. 31, compulsory licensing is permitted but subject to certain conditions, including the
payment of ‘adequate remuneration’ to the right-holder.
21 Section 301 Report, p. 28. But the technology transferred to a WFOE may still ‘leak’ through its employees
who leave the WFOE to join a competitor or start their own competing "rms.
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transfer of technology is the unavoidable consequence of local operations (such as co-
management and the hiring of local employees in a JV) or of contractual arrangements
to overcome the ownership restrictions, it is a matter of insu!cient or inadequate
regulation. To the extent that the government uses ownership restrictions to evade its
treaty obligations, such as the alleged government practice of demanding technology
transfer through a Chinese JV partner, it is a problem of enforcement against evasion of
existing WTO obligations.
The problem of insu!cient enforcement of WTO law looms large in light of China’s
explicit WTO commitments not to compel technology transfer. According to the
USA, China uses indirect and implicit means, such as oral instructions, to coerce
technology transfer, which do not leave a paper trail and hence are ‘almost impossi-
ble to prosecute.’24 And this di!culty is further exacerbated by the reality that few
foreign "rms are willing to testify on record for fear of Chinese government retalia-
tion, even though a signi"cant number of them have reported receiving such pressure
in con"dential industry surveys.25 The lack of regulatory transparency, the complex
relationship between the State and the private sector, and concerns about retaliation
have been identi"ed as the key elements that have enabled China’s practices to persist.26
Apparently, it is the challenge of proving implicit government actions that has stopped
the USA from bringing a WTO complaint on the issue of forced technology transfer.
Meanwhile, China has categorically denied any wrongdoing, claiming that the Section
301 Report does not contain any ‘solid evidence that could demonstrate that the
Chinese government actually forced foreign companies to transfer technology.’27
In the end, however, the challenge of proving the case of implicit government actions
can only be met by taking China to the WTO dispute settlement forum. The key issues
in such WTO litigation will be the standard of proof and attribution. As a general rule,
WTO panels enjoy wide latitude in admitting and evaluating evidence of any kind and
in deciding what weight to ascribe to each particular piece of evidence.28 In practice,
unwritten measures have been successfully challenged under WTO law, based primarily
on evidence from secondary sources, such as industry surveys, media reports, and
policy statements of government o!cials.29 As for attribution, it should not be an issue
in the case of forced disclosure of proprietary information in administrative processes,
since it is clearly the government that has requested the information. Attribution would
be an issue in the case of technology transfer demanded by a local JV partner, as the
24 Section 301 Report, p. 21.
25 Id., pp. 22–23 (citing member surveys conducted by the US–China Business Council and the American
Chamber of Commerce in China).
26 Id., p. 21.
27 Statement by Ambassador Dr Zhang Xiangchen at the WTO DSB meeting on 28 May 2018, http://wto2.
mofcom.gov.cn/article/chinaviewpoins/201805/20180502749669.shtml.
28 Panel Report, US – Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products "om Japan, WT/DS184/R,
28 February 2001, para 7.10 (citing Appellate Body Report in US – Shrimp, paras 104–06). See generally
Graham Cook, ‘De"ning the Standard of Proof in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings: Jurists’ Prudence
and Jurisprudence’, 1 Journal of International Trade and Arbitration Law 50 (2012) (suggesting that the
WTO standard of proof is one of the ‘balance of probabilities’).
29 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Measures A!ecting the Importation of Goods, WT/DS438, 444,
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complainant must prove that the JV partner’s action is attributable to the government.
But there are some well-established criteria for attributing the conduct of private parties
to the government under WTO law.30 Without actual WTO litigation, however, it will
not be possible to determine whether the WTO tribunal is able to apply proper standard
of proof and attribution rules to address the particular situation in China. It is therefore
regrettable that the USA has forgone WTO litigation to enforce China’s explicit com-
mitments on technology transfer,31 especially in light of Beijing’s willingness to date to
comply with adverse WTO rulings.32
The present study aims at tackling the problem of insu!cient regulation, rather than
insu!cient enforcement of existing law. Given that ownership restrictions on foreign
investment are neither generally prohibited by international law nor fully regulated by
WTO speci"c disciplines, forced technology transfer in this context will be the main
focus of the study. The issue, however, will need to be examined against the broader
context of existing international regulation on technology transfer.
II. FORCED TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: ORIGIN, EVOLUTION,
AND EFFECT
Forced technology transfer has its origin in the ‘market for technology’ policy developed
in the early days of China’s economic reform. When it "rst opened up to foreign direct
investment (FDI), China had a central-planned economy. Under the initial plan, foreign
invested enterprises (FIEs) would sell all their products abroad, so that China could
gain access to international markets and earn much-needed foreign exchange, on the
one hand, and protect its domestic producers from foreign competition, on the other.
Yet, considering the interests of foreign investors in selling to the Chinese market,
the government would grant limited market access to the investors who were willing
and able to bring advanced technologies to China. That FIEs should ‘either export or
utilize advanced technology’ was the original version of China’s market-for-technology
policy. This policy was explicitly adopted by the foreign investment laws.33 To ensure
that its foreign exchange would be well spent, the government also mandated that all
technologies brought to China must be ‘advanced’ and all technology import contracts
be separately reviewed and approved by government agencies.34
30 GATT Panel Report, Japan – Semi-Conductors (adopted 4 May 1988), L/6309 – 35S/116, paras 108–17. See
generally Geraldo Vidigal, ‘Attribution in the WTO: The Limits of ‘Su!cient Government Involvement’, 6
(Special Issue) Journal of International Trade and Arbitration Law 133–160 (2017).
31 See Jennifer Hillman, The Best Way to Address China’s Unfair Policies and Practices is Through a Big , Bold
Multilateral Case at the WTO, testimony at Hearing on U.S. Tools to Address Chinese Market Distortions,
U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission, 8 June 2018.
32 See generally Weihuan Zhou, China’s Implementation of the Rulings of the World Trade Organization (Oxford:
Hart Publishing, 2019).
33 See e.g. PRC Law on Foreign-Invested Enterprises (1986), art. 3. FIEs that were ‘export-oriented’ or ‘utilizing
advanced technology’ also received preferential treatment from the government. See Provisions of the State
Council on the Encouragement of Foreign Investment (11 October 1986).
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China’s WTO accession in 2001 prompted a major revamp of its FDI laws and
policies.35
To comply with the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
(TRIMS), China removed the mandatory requirements on export performance, local
content, and foreign exchange balancing. More signi"cantly, because China made
a special WTO commitment not to condition the approval of foreign investment
on ‘the transfer of technology’ or ‘the conduct of research and development in
China,’36 it also removed the requirement that FIEs import advanced technologies.
Furthermore, following its WTO accession, technology import contracts no longer
require government approvals unless the subject technology is on the list of restricted
technologies.37
However, removing the ‘market-for-technology’ types of requirements from the
rulebook does not mean the elimination of such requirements in practice. In fact, the old
policy can still be easily implemented, given that foreign investment remains subject to
equity restrictions and speci"c government approvals. Moreover, the industry catalogue
China uses to guide FDI has continued to divide investment projects into the categories
of encouraged, permitted, restricted, and prohibited, with the encouraged category
covering projects ‘utilizing new and advanced technologies’ and the restricted category
covering projects deemed ‘technologically lagging behind.’38
China’s FDI regime, however, will change dramatically when its new Foreign Invest-
ment Law takes e#ect on 1 January 2020. Under the new Law, except for sectors
identi"ed on the negative list,39 foreign investment projects will no longer require gov-
ernment approval, thus reversing a basic FDI policy of forty years. The new Law
also explicitly prohibits government agencies and their sta# from ‘using administrative
means to force the transfer of technology.’40 The reference to ‘forced technology trans-
fer’ is the "rst in Chinese legislation. It can be viewed as a gesture of compromise in the
trade war, considering that Beijing has never admitted the existence of the problem.41
On the whole, the market-for-technology policy appears to have worked successfully.
When the policy was "rst adopted some thirty years ago, China was ‘a horse-and-cart
economy’ without even a basic IP infrastructure.42 Today, the country has turned into a
35 See generally Julia Ya Qin, ‘Trade, Investment and Beyond: The Impact of WTO Accession on China’s Legal
System’, 191 (Special Issue) The China Quarterly 720–741 (2007).
36 WTO, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432, 10 November 2001,
Section 7(3).
37 PRC Regulation on Import and Export of Technologies, State Council Decree No. 331 (10 December 2001),
e#ective 1 January 2002.
38 State Council, Provisions Guiding the Direction of Foreign Direct Investment, Order No. 346 (2002); NDRC
and MOFCOM, Catalogue of Industries for Guiding Foreign Investment (2017 Revision).
39 Foreign Investment Law, supra note 15. The latest negative list contains 40 sectors and sub-sectors in which
foreign investment is restricted. See NDRC and MOFCOM, Special Management Measures for the Market
Entry of Foreign Investment (Negative List) (2019 Version), e#ective 30 July 2019.
40 Foreign Investment Law, supra note 15, art. 22.
41 See State Council Information O!ce, China’s Position on the China–US Economic and Trade Consultations
( June 2019) (stating the accusation of forced technology transfer is ‘utterly unfounded’).







/jiel/article-abstract/22/4/743/5618741 by guest on 16 M
arch 2020
Forced technology transfer and the US–China trade war • 751
technology powerhouse, rivaling with the USA, Europe, and Japan in "elds ranging from
high-speed rail, to space, mobile communications, and arti"cial intelligence. This dra-
matic transformation can be attributed to many factors, but the market-for-technology
policy has played an important role. China’s vast and fast-growing market has attracted
every multinational corporation to it. When faced with the demand that sales to China
be accompanied by local manufacturing and technology transfer, foreign "rms are
o$en obliged to accept, given their need for revenue growth. These circumstances, for
example, are said to have sowed the seeds for China’s eventual success in 5G networks.43
However, the policy has not proven successful in every sector. A well-known example
is the automotive sector. To develop its own auto industry, China has imposed a 50/50
JV requirement for foreign investment in the manufacturing of automobiles. Attracted
by the potential Chinese market, every major auto company has formed such JVs with
Chinese "rms (typically state-owned). Today, China is the largest manufacturer as well
as the largest consumer market for automobiles. Yet, the country has not produced a
single name-brand vehicle of its own. Apparently, foreign auto companies have refrained
from transferring key technologies to the Chinese, while earning he$y pro"ts and
royalties in a prosperous market.44
By contrast, the high-speed rail industry exempli"es the policy’s success. China’s
railway industry is completely owned and controlled by the state. In order to develop
high-speed rail, the Ministry of Railways tendered bids to foreign "rms, requiring
the foreign bidders to form JVs with two government-owned entities and transfer
technology to the JVs. The handful industry leaders—Siemens, Alstom, Bombardier,
and Kawasaki—all competed to win the bids for access to the world’s largest railway
market. This enabled China to acquire the most advanced technologies at low cost.
Within a decade therea$er, the Chinese had mastered and improved the technologies
and became the biggest player in the global market.45
Judging from these examples, the impact of the market-for-technology policy may
depend on the market structure of a speci"c industry. Where there is limited competi-
tion, as in the railway industry, the policy is likely to succeed; where there is su!cient
competition, as in the auto sector, foreign investors may better withstand the pressure
for transferring their core technologies.46 In addition, it should be noted that, compared
to equity restrictions, the requirement of local manufacturing—a practice apparently
43 Kiran Stacey, ‘Why is There No US Rival to Compete with Huawei’, Financial Times, 26 April 2019.
44 See Jane Cai and Keegan Elmer, ‘Is the US right to cry foul about forced technology transfer to do business in
China–and What is Beijing’s Position?’, South China Morning Post, 10 January 2019; Anjani Travedi, ‘Behind
the Myth of China’s Great Technology Grab: The Issue of Forced Transfers is Overstated. Carmakers Know
How to Safeguard Their Most Advanced Know-how’, Bloomberg, 22 December 2018.
45 See Zhenhua Chen and Kingsley Haynes, ‘A Short History of Technology Transfer and Capture: High
Speed Rail in China’ (2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2872527; Rongfang
Liu et al., ‘High Speed Rail Development in China: A Case Study of State-Guided Technology Trans-
fer’, Oxford Scholarship Online (2016), https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/
9780198753568.001.0001/acprof-9780198753568-chapter-6.
46 See Liu et al., id. (comparing the high-speed rail industry, which has only a handful of manufacturers from
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inconsistent with the TRIMS Agreement—may have played an even greater role in the
dissemination of technology to China.47
III. INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
There is no generally applicable international agreement on technology transfer. Given
that technology owners are private actors, it is di!cult to regulate their behavior
e#ectively through international disciplines. Attesting to such di!culties were the
decade-long e#orts (1976–85) to conclude a multilateral agreement within the United
Nations—the International Code of Conduct for the Transfer of Technology.48 Driven
by the demand of developing countries to increase the %ow of technology from devel-
oped countries, the Code enacted principles of fair and equitable dealings and other
norms to strengthen the position of technology-acquiring countries vis-à-vis technol-
ogy suppliers. The dra$ Code, however, was never adopted, thanks to the North–
South divide on the desirability of such an instrument.49 The trend of international
rulemaking has since shi$ed to strengthening the position of technology suppliers.
Most signi"cantly, the conclusion of the TRIPS Agreement has made the protection
of IP rights enforceable through WTO dispute settlement. And a number of free trade
and investment agreements have outlawed mandatory technology transfer.50
A. Investment agreements
Requiring foreign investors to transfer technology is known as one type of ‘performance
requirements’ imposed by the host country on foreign investors. Performance require-
ments have been widely used, especially by developing countries, as a tool to manage
FDI for achieving certain policy objectives. Examples of commonly used performance
requirements include purchasing a certain level of local products, exporting a certain
level of locally produced products, achieving a speci"c level of local jobs, transferring
technology to the country, conducting research activities in the country, taking speci"c
environmental and social actions, and forming JVs with local partners.51
Despite their wide use, performance requirements remain controversial. Proponents
see them as a useful tool to maximize the bene"t of FDI for local development, whereas
critics view them as ine#ective or even counterproductive. The latter view is re%ected
in the restriction of performance requirements under investment agreements and the
WTO TRIMS.52
47 See Steve Dickenson, ‘China’s New Foreign Investment Law and Forced Technology Transfer: Same as It
Ever Was’, China Law Blog (29 March 2019), https://www.chinalawblog.com/?s=forced+manufactur.
48 UNCTAD, Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology as of 5 June 1985, TD/-
CODE/TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER/47, 1985.
49 P.G. Sampath and P. Ro#e, ‘Unpacking the International Technology Transfer Debate: Fi$y Years and
Beyond’, ICTSD Working Paper ( June 2012) 25–28.
50 See generally Jonathan Bonnitcha, ‘Investment Wars: Contestation and Confusion in Debate about Invest-
ment,’ 22 (4) Journal of International Economic Law (forthcoming), section 3.
51 S. N. Nikiema, ‘Performance Requirements in Investment Treaties’, IISD (2014) 2–3, http://www.iisd.org/
sites/default/"les/publications/best-practices-performance-requirements-investment-treaties-en.pdf .
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The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is the "rst treaty to restrict
performance requirements. Its investment chapter prohibits seven types of perfor-
mance requirements, including the requirement to ‘transfer technology, a production
process or other proprietary knowledge’ to a person in the host country, in connection
with the establishment or operation of foreign investment.53 Similar clauses have since
entered all free trade agreements (FTAs) negotiated by the USA,54 as well as the
US Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT).55 A number of non-US FTAs have also
restricted performance requirements, including those concluded by Canada, EU, Japan,
Australia, Singapore, and South Korea that speci"cally prohibit the requirement of
technology transfer.56 More signi"cantly, the largest multilateral FTA to date—the
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Paci"c Partnership (CPTPP)—
contains elaborate provisions on performance requirements, including a broad restric-
tion on the requirement of technology transfer.57
Interestingly, although JV requirement typically results in the transfer of technology
to local entities, none of the investment agreements have categorized mandatory JV as
one of the performance requirements to be eliminated. Rather, equity restrictions on
foreign investment have been treated as a matter of market access, subject to negotiated
extent of national treatment. Under NAFTA, for example, Mexico is obligated to grant
national treatment to US and Canadian investors with respect to the establishment and
acquisitions in Mexico.58 The obligation, however, is subject to speci"c exceptions.
Thus, Mexico was able to maintain equity restriction on foreign investment in various
sectors, such as the 49% ceiling in aviation.59
B. Technology transfer under WTO Law
Technology transfer is not a subject directly regulated by WTO rules.60 The handful of
references to the term in the WTO multilateral agreements all concern encouragement
of technology transfer, especially from developed countries to developing countries.
The only exceptions are the China-speci"c rules under its accession protocol and
certain implicit disciplines under GATS mode 3.
1. TRIPS
The TRIPS Agreement a#ects cross-border technology transfer by strengthening IP
rights of technology owners but is silent on the issue of mandatory technology transfer.
Article 7 (Objectives) states that the protection and enforcement of IP rights ‘should
53 NAFTA, art. 1106(f).
54 See https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements.
55 The 2012 US Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 8.
56 Source: UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements Navigator, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/
international-investment-agreements; OECD, supra note 10, Table A1.
57 CPTPP, art. 9.10. CPTPP was concluded among 11 countries (Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan,
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam) and took e#ect in January 2019.
58 NAFTA, art. 1102.
59 US Department of State, 2017 Investment Climate Statements: Mexico, https://www.state.gov/reports/2017-
investment-climate-statements/mexico/.
60 See generally Bernard M. Hoekman, Keith E. Maskus and Kamal Saggi, ‘Transfer of Technology to Develop-
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contribute’ to the transfer and dissemination of technology. Article 8.2 (Principles)
recognizes that WTO members may need to adopt appropriate measures to prevent
practices that ‘adversely a#ect the international transfer of technology.’ Notably, Article
66.2 (Least-Developed Country Members) mandates that developed country members
‘shall provide incentives’ to their enterprises and institutions for the purpose of ‘pro-
moting and encouraging technology transfer’ to least-developed country members,
although how the mandate should be implemented remains unclear.
2. TRIMS
The TRIMS Agreement is one of the two WTO agreements that address investment
issues (the other being GATS). It focuses on ‘trade-related’ performance requirements,
prohibiting measures that are considered inconsistent with GATT Article III (National
Treatment) or Article XI (Quantitative Restrictions). The TRIMS illustrative list of
prohibited measures covers local content, export performance, and foreign exchange
limit and makes no mention of technology transfer. It was noted that the USA originally
sought broader disciplines on performance requirements, including technology transfer
requirements, but this position did not receive general support.61
3. GATS
In contrast to TRIMS, GATS addresses investment issues by liberalizing FDI in service
sectors. Under mode 3 (the supply of services through commercial presence in the
host country),62 each WTO member undertakes speci"c liberalization commitments
as inscribed in its GATS Schedule. Unless otherwise noted in its Schedule, a member
is obligated to (i) open all domestic service sectors to FDI, including eliminating
foreign ownership restrictions (market-access commitments), and (ii) grant national
treatment to foreign investors in respect of all measures a#ecting the supply of such
services (national-treatment commitments). The extent of these commitments varies
from member to member, depending on the results of their original negotiations.
Without mentioning technology transfer explicitly, GATS can nonetheless regulate
mandatory technology transfer in two ways. One is through the elimination of owner-
ship restrictions. Under Article XVI, a member shall not maintain equity limitations
on foreign capital in sectors where it has made market-access commitments, unless
otherwise speci"ed in its Schedule.63 Thus, GATS limits the instances of technology
transfer via ownership restrictions, including JV requirements, to the explicitly sched-
uled conditions to the market-access commitments of each member. The other way
for GATS to regulate mandatory technology transfer is through the national-treatment
commitments under Article XVII. Requiring foreign investors to transfer technology
may violate such commitments, unless otherwise speci"ed in the relevant Schedule.
This understanding is re%ected, for example, in the Schedule of India, where India
inscribed a horizontal condition to mode 3 national treatment with respect to its
61 See Michael J. Trebilcock and Robert Howse, The Regulation of International Trade, 2nd ed., (London:
Routledge, 1999) 352.
62 GATS, art. I:2(c).
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policy of giving preference to foreign entities that ‘o#er the best terms for transfer of
technology.’64 It is also worth noting that in its bid to join the WTO, China originally
reserved the right to require foreign providers to transfer technology in two speci"c
sectors in its GATS schedule,65 but its "nal Schedule no longer contains such entries.
4. China’s accession protocol
Unlike other WTO members, China is bound by a special obligation regarding manda-
tory technology transfer under its accession protocol. Speci"cally, the protocol requires
China to ensure that any government approval of foreign investment is not conditioned
upon ‘performance requirements of any kind, such as local content, o#sets, the transfer
of technology, export performance or the conduct of research and development in
China.’66 This broad requirement goes well beyond TRIMS, hence is one of the WTO-
plus obligations of China.67 As noted above, this China-speci"c obligation has given
rise to EU’s formal WTO complaint against China.68
In sum, international regulation of technology transfer is rather porous. With respect
to technology transfer as a performance requirement, only a limited number of coun-
tries have undertaken to eliminate it under FTAs, and only China has undertaken
the same within the WTO framework. As for technology transfer via mandatory JVs,
it is constrained only to the extent of speci"c undertakings under FTAs or GATS
mode 3. Instead of outright prohibition, the FTAs and GATS have treated foreign
ownership restrictions as a matter of market access, subject to negotiated extent of
national treatment.
IV. MARKET FOR TECHNOLOGY: A NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Requiring technology transfer in foreign investment, whether implemented through
administrative means or ownership restrictions, is in essence a policy of market for
technology. As discussed above, international regulation in this regard is far from
uniform or consistent. While compelling technology transfer through administrative
means has been outlawed by certain FTAs, mandatory JVs remain by and large a valid
means of acquiring foreign technology. In practice, foreign ownership restrictions are
fairly common;69 and a number of countries have adopted policies similar to those
64 GATS/SC/42. I am indebted to Ruosi Zhang for this understanding and for the India example.
65 They were ‘advertising services’ under mode 3 Market Access (requiring foreign providers to provide
advanced technology as a condition to form joint ventures), and ‘onshore oil"eld services’ under mode
3 National Treatment (requiring foreign providers to transfer technology to Chinese personnel). GAT-
S/SC/19 (15 April 1994).
66 Supra note 36. This obligation is further elaborated in WPR, supra note 17, para 203.
67 See generally Julia Ya Qin, ‘WTO-Plus’ Obligations and Their Implications for the WTO Legal System: An
Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol’, 37 Journal of World Trade 483 (2003).
68 See supra note 7.
69 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2018, p. 153 ("nding that JV requirements remain common in many
countries, especially in resource sectors and sectors with a public service responsibility, but have become rare
in manufacturing and adjacent services industries, and that equity requirements are di!cult to implement
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in China.70 The US–China trade war, however, is challenging the legitimacy of this
policy tool.
Hence the normative question: Is the policy of market for technology a legitimate
tool for economic and technological development, and why? Addressing this question
is critically important, not only because it is necessary for the resolution of US–China
trade con%icts, but also because it will implicate the development strategies of many
other countries.
A widely held view in China sees the market-for-technology policy as a perfectly
legitimate tool for economic development. In this view, the policy embodies a fair
exchange of economic opportunities, because all foreign "rms come to China volun-
tarily and they will not do so without calculating the potential bene"t of entering the
Chinese market against the cost of losing certain technologies to the Chinese. Moreover,
the policy does not require a free transfer of technology—foreign "rms get paid for their
technologies based on negotiated terms. Furthermore, the policy is not inconsistent
with international legal norms, as free market access for foreign investment is not a given
and must be negotiated on a case-by-case basis.
In the view of Western critics, however, the transfer of technology compelled by
the market-for-technology policy is not truly ‘voluntary’ in nature, but rather the
outcome of ‘a de facto cartel’ organized by the Chinese government, in which ‘Chinese
purchasers collude to expropriate key technologies’ from foreign suppliers.71 According
to this view, the practice amounts to unfair competition in the marketplace. From the
perspective of economic theory, when China demands a tradeo# between market access
and technology transfer, it behaves as monopsony, that is, it has the power of a single
buyer with a substantial control over the market in which there are many would-be
foreign sellers. Like monopoly power on the supply side, monopsony power on the
demand side can produce economic harm. Where there is monopsony, the price of
input tends to be depressed below the competitive level, resulting in a decrease in the
overall quantity of the input produced. Thus, the market-for-technology policy may
have deterred foreign "rms from investing or operating in China at the optimal level.
In the long run, the policy may also harm the broader global economy in that it may
tilt the playing "eld in favor of less innovative Chinese "rms in the global technology
market, thereby limiting the resources %owing to the world’s most innovative "rms.72
To summarize, the prevailing view in China sees the tradeo# between market access
and technology transfer as a fair exchange because the choice is to be made by the free
will of market participants. This view is based on the assumption that market access
is not a given. Western critics, on the other hand, seem to assume that market access
70 See Robert D. Atkinson, Hearing on ‘The Impact of International Technology Transfer on American
Research and Development’ Before the House Science Committee Subcommittee on Investigations and
Oversight of U.S. House of Representatives (5 December 2012) (identifying Portugal, Malaysia, Indonesia,
Venezuela, and India as having adopted similar market-for-technology policies).
71 Lee G. Branstetter, ‘China’s Forced Technology Transfer Problem–And What to Do About It’, PIIE Policy
Brief 18-13 ( June 2018), at 3.
72 Id., at 3–4. See also Thomas J. Holms, Ellen R. McGrattan and Edward C. Prescott, ‘Quid Pro Quo:
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should in principle be free from government intervention. Based on this assumption,
the exchange between market access and technology transfer is fundamentally unfair.
The economic theory of monopsony supports this view in that it depicts the China
situation as one in which numerous would-be foreign sellers must deal with the Chinese
government that acts as a single buyer due to its control over market access.
In the view of this author, the theory of government monopsony is valid, but its
validity may have to be discounted when applied to the situation involving technology
transfer. That is because the would-be foreign sellers, as the holders of related IP rights,
enjoy state-granted monopoly over their IP-protected technologies. Monopoly is anti-
competition in nature. Domestic and international regimes have long been concerned
with the issue of how to strike a proper balance between the protection of IP rights and
the need to prevent abusive practice of IP holders.73 Given such concerns, when gov-
ernment monopsony confronts IP monopolies, it is possible that their anticompetitive
e#ects may o#set each other at least to some extent.
Ultimately, the question of whether ‘market for technology’ represents a fair
exchange cannot be answered in absolute terms. Rather, the answer may depend
on the relative level of economic and technological development in the country in
question. Take China as example. When it "rst adopted the market-for-technology
policy nearly four decades ago, China was an economic and technological backwater.
The types of foreign technology it could e#ectively absorb were not the most advanced
in any "eld. Under such circumstances, the government requirement that foreign "rms
bring in desirable technology in exchange for market access would not threaten their
competitiveness. On the contrary, foreign "rms would bene"t from the dissemination
of knowledge in China, as it enabled the Chinese to become more e!cient and
sophisticated producers in the global supply chains led by the technologically advanced
"rms. Fast forward to the second decade of the 21st century, China has transformed
itself into the world’s second largest economy, capable of absorbing cutting-edge
technologies in any "eld. Some Chinese "rms have emerged as global leaders and many
as formidable competitors of foreign "rms. Under these circumstances, ‘market for
technology’, enforced by the government through administrative means or ownership
restrictions, can no longer be deemed a fair exchange. When China becomes capable of
competing with others on an equal footing, such government intervention will result
in creating an unfair advantage for Chinese "rms at the expense of foreign competitors.
That is also why the issue of forced technology transfer did not come to the fore until
more recent years, even though China’s market-for-technology policy had existed for
decades. Fairness requires the similarly situated to be treated similarly. Imagine if the
EU, Japan, or South Korea were to adopt such a policy, would it be considered fair play?
At this juncture, it is necessary to consider China’s status as a developing country.
Under the world trading system, developing countries are entitled to special and di#er-
ential treatment (S&D), which generally translates into more policy space and fewer
commitments in trade and investment liberalization. Except for ‘the least-developed
73 See generally Keith Maskus, Private Rights and Public Problems: The Global Economics of Intellectual Property
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countries’ (LDCs), the developing country status within the WTO is based on self-
declaration.74 In its WTO accession, China was treated as a developing country in
principle but was denied certain S&D.75 The average of China’s import tari# bindings
on industrial products was about 10%, which was signi"cantly higher than the average
of 3%–4% for developed countries, but much lower than other large countries such as
India and Brazil, which maintained average tari# bindings around 30%.76
Despite the dramatic rise in its economic power, China refuses to give up its devel-
oping country status.77 Insisting on China being the largest developing country has
become a political mantra of Beijing. It is true that China’s GDP per capita remains well
below the average of OECD countries and that about 30 million Chinese still live below
the poverty line.78 However, what matters most to the rest of the world is China’s ‘com-
prehensive national power,’ a concept developed by the Chinese themselves.79 When
considering the aggregate of a variety of factors, including economic power, science
and technology, education, territory, natural resources, population, military force, and
domestic governance, China is clearly a contemporary superpower. Consequently, there
is little reason why China should not be treated as an equal of the OECD countries when
it comes to the policy of technology transfer and market access. In this regard, it should
be noted that the USA is challenging the practice of self-declared development status at
the WTO, and the issue is poised to be a major item on the WTO-reform agenda.80
V. INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF FORCED TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER:
A PROPOSAL
In light of the above analysis, the key to international regulation of forced technology
transfer lies in the di#erentiation of levels of economic and technological development
of the prospective technology-receiving countries.81 As shown in the case of China,
when the country is at a relatively low level of economic and technological development,
74 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement), art. XI:2, recognizes
the category of LDCs by the UN criteria.
75 For example, China may not invoke certain provisions of Article 27 of the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (SCM) that provide S&D to developing countries. On agriculture subsidies, China
was granted a de minimis level of 8.5%, which was higher than the 5% level for developed countries but below
the 10% level for developing countries speci"ed in Article 6.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture. See WPR,
supra note 17, paras 171–74, 235.
76 Nicholas Lardy, Integrating China into the Global Economy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press,
2002) 79.
77 Wang Shouwen, Vice Minister of Commerce, declared at the MOFCOM press brie"ng on the issues of WTO
reform in November 2018: ‘We do not allow other members to deprive China of the special and di#erential
treatment of developing members that we deserve.’ http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/
press/201811/20181102810628.shtml.
78 See World Bank, https://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/poverty/33EF03BB-9722-4AE2-
ABC7-AA2972D68AFE/Archives-2019/Global_POVEQ_CHN.pdf .
79 Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington, D.C.: National Defense
University Press, 2000), ch. 5 (discussing the Chinese origin of the concept).
80 WTO, Communication "om the United States: An Undi!erentiated WTO: Self-Declared Development Status
Risks Institutional Irrelevance, WT/GC/W/757, 16 January 2019) (‘The US Initiative on Development
Status’).
81 It has been suggested that on the transfer of technology to developing countries, generally, a country-
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government policy requiring foreign "rms to share technology in exchange for market
access may result in a mutually bene"cial situation. Yet, when the country reaches a
certain level of technological capacity and its domestic entities emerge as potential
competitors to the foreign "rms, it becomes unfair and even harmful to allow the gov-
ernment to pursue the same market-for-technology policy, as such a policy will create
unfair advantages for its domestic "rms, resulting in unfair competition in international
trade and investment.
Accordingly, international regulation should not seek to impose an outright ban on
the market-for-technology exchange. Instead, it should recognize as a matter of princi-
ple: (i) the market-for-technology policy adopted by poor countries could enhance the
positive spillover e#ect of knowledge dissemination without causing unfair competition
in the market, hence could be a legitimate tool of economic development; and (ii)
the policy would constitute an unfair practice when adopted by countries with a
certain level of economic and technological capacity. Following this principle, it will be
necessary, "rst, to have a country-classi"cation system, then a discipline on the unfair
practice.
How can we design a country-classi"cation system capable of di#erentiating among
countries with di#erent levels of economic and technological development? Admit-
tedly, the task would be highly challenging both politically and technically. That said,
there could be some synergy between this proposal and the broader US initiative on
di#erentiation of development levels among WTO members.82 As noted by the USA,
international organizations have had years of experience in classifying economies. The
World Bank, for instance, divides countries into four groups based on gross national
income (GNI) per capita (low income, lower-middle income, upper-middle income,
and high income) and adjusts the income thresholds each year in line with price in%a-
tion. Currently, the high-income group includes 80 countries, and the upper-middle
income group 60 countries covering notably China, Brazil, Mexico, Turkey, and South
Africa.83
More signi"cantly, a number of institutions have created indices to measure
technological and innovation capabilities at the country level.84 While di#ering in their
methodologies and coverage, these indices ‘tend to measure in di#erent ways the same
factors’ such as human capital, infrastructure, public and private research expenditure,
and innovation outputs such as patents and publications, and ‘the country-rankings
82 The US Initiative on Development Status, supra note 80, at 8–10. Signi"cantly, the US Initiative has
received a positive response from Brazil, which has agreed to forgo special and di#erential treatment in
WTO negotiations. See Joint Statement from President Donald J. Trump and President Jair Bolsonaro
(19 March 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/brie"ngs-statements/joint-statement-president-donald-j-
trump-president-jair-bolsonaro/.
83 See World Bank, https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-
country-and-lending-groups.
84 See UNCTAD, Transfer of Technology and Knowledge Sharing for Development (2014), 7 (identifying the
Innovation Capability Index by UNCTAD, the Technology Achievement Index by UNDP, the Global
Competitive Index by the World Economic Forum, the Knowledge Economy Index by the World Bank,
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generated by these indicators present very high correlation coe!cients.’85 Take for
example the Global Innovation Index (GII) co-published by Connell University,
INSEAD and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).86 Currently in
its 12th edition, the GII Report ranks innovation capabilities and performances of
more than 120 economies each year. The GII scores are calculated on the basis of two
sub-indices: the innovation input sub-index, which comprises "ve pillars that enable
innovative activities—institutions, human capital and research, infrastructure, market
sophistication, and business sophistication; and the innovation output sub-index,
which calculates knowledge/technology and creative outputs, measured by patent
applications, publications in peer-reviewed journals, high-tech net exports, mobile
app creation, exports of cultural goods and services, increases in labor productivity,
and many other factors. For the year of 2018, the GII top 10 are Switzerland, the
Netherlands, Sweden, UK, Singapore, United States, Finland, Denmark, Germany,
and Ireland; of the large developing countries, China ranked the 17th (above Canada
(18th), Italy (31st), and Australia (20th)), Mexico 56th, India 57th, South Africa 58th,
Brazil 64th, Argentina 80th, and Indonesia 85th.87
For our purposes, the most instructive "ndings of the GII 2018 report include
the following: (i) there exists a positive link between innovation performance and an
economy’s level of development as measured by GDP per capita; (ii) country size
(re%ected by population size) is not correlated with the GII scores in a statistically
signi"cant way; and (iii) economies at all levels of development happen to be more
innovative when they have a more diversi"ed export portfolio.88 In light of these
"ndings, the country-classi"cation system for international regulation of technology
transfer could be intelligently designed by reference to a combination of income-based
rankings (GDP or GNI per capita) and the rankings by innovation indices, such as the
GII scores.
It should be recognized, however, that technological capabilities tend to vary from
sector to sector, and a country-based classi"cation system may not be able to re%ect such
variances. Moreover, a country’s technological capabilities are constantly changing,
thus measuring such capabilities is necessarily a dynamic process. Given the imprecise
nature of any country-classi"cation scheme, the new discipline on technology transfer
would need to have certain built-in %exibility.
It is suggested here that such %exibility could be achieved by following the model
of GATS mode 3. As already discussed, GATS mode 3 contains market-access com-
mitments of WTO members on FDI in service sectors. Unless otherwise speci"ed
in its GATS Schedule, a member may not impose equity restrictions, such as JV
requirements, on FDI in any of the service sectors covered by GATS. The elimination
of equity restrictions forestalls the possibility of compelled transfer of technology to
local JV partners and gives the foreign investor a better control over its proprietary
information. Under mode 3, a member is also required to accord national treatment
85 Id.
86 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org.
87 Global Innovation Index 2018, https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/gii-2018-report.
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to foreign investors in respect of all measures a#ecting services, which include any
requirement on technology transfer, unless otherwise speci"ed in its Schedule. The
limitations and conditions on market access and national treatment are agreed and
speci"ed in the Schedule of each member based on the result of multilateral negoti-
ations. A member’s Schedule may be modi"ed and speci"c commitments withdrawn
through renegotiations or otherwise as permitted under GATS Article XXI. In addition,
all GATS commitments are subject to the general public policy and national security
exceptions under Articles XIV and XIV bis.
For the new discipline on technology transfer, a similar approach could be adopted
to cover both goods and services sectors. Thus, each member would make commit-
ments not to impose ownership restrictions on foreign investment or otherwise impose
requirements on technology transfer in each of the goods and services sectors, unless
otherwise speci"ed. However, as a matter of principle, countries that have reached a
certain level of economic and technological capacity, as predetermined by the country-
classi"cation system, would not be allowed to depart from those general commitments.
Considering the inevitable variances in the technological capabilities of countries clas-
si"ed in the same category, the actual commitments of individual countries in speci"c
sectors might di#er depending on the results of multilateral negotiations. In addition,
periodic renegotiations of the commitments should be scheduled, so as to be responsive
to changes in the economic and technological capabilities of countries. Like GATS,
all commitments under the technology-transfer discipline should be made subject to
general public policy and security exceptions, thus safeguarding the legitimate interests
of all countries involved.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The ongoing US–China trade war has given rise to the call for international regulation
of ‘forced technology transfer’. While lacking a precise de"nition, the term can be
broadly understood as referring to a situation in which the government compels a
foreign "rm to share its proprietary technology as a condition for accessing its domestic
market. The government may compel the disclosure of foreign propriety information
through administrative processes, such as approvals and licensing requirements that
are unnecessary for legitimate regulatory purposes. This type of practice amounts to
disguised government expropriation of foreign IP rights in violation of well-established
international norms, thus must be condemned. The government may also compel
technology transfer via equity restrictions on foreign investment. Foreign ownership
restrictions, however, are not generally prohibited by international law. In fact, they
are commonly practiced. Hence, how to regulate such restrictions presents a major
challenge.
In order to establish a new discipline on technology transfer, a threshold question
must be answered: Is the market-for-technology exchange an unfair practice or a legit-
imate policy of economic development? To the extent that the government controls
market access, it wields the power of a monopsony, which is anticompetitive by nature.
This monopsony power, however, might be used to o#set the anticompetitive e#ects of
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As shown in the case of China, when the host country is at a relatively low level of
economic and technological development, the market-for-technology policy tends to
create a mutually bene"cial situation for the host country and foreign investors. But as
the country reaches a certain level of technological capabilities and its domestic "rms
become potential competitors of foreign "rms, the market-for-technology policy can
no longer be considered a fair practice.
Accordingly, this article proposes that international regulation should adopt a
country-classi"cation system capable of di#erentiating among countries with di#erent
levels of economic and technological development. Only countries that have reached
a certain level of development would be prohibited from using ownership restrictions
as a means to acquire foreign technology. Following the model of GATS mode 3, such
prohibition could be negotiated and recorded on a country-speci"c basis as the market-
access commitments in both goods and service sectors, subject only to public policy
exceptions.
All positive change in the world begins with an idea. It is my hope that the proposal
made in this article, no matter how unrealistic it may seem at the moment, will con-
tribute to the eventual enactment of a new discipline that is capable of promoting wide
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